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THE ETHICAL VISIONS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
James Grimmelmann*
INTRODUCTION
All of intellectual property law is an act of imagination. If a tree falls in
a forest and no one is around to call it “property,” the tree still exists. But
the objects of intellectual property have no existence apart from what we
give them. You can’t copyright an unwritten novel; you have no trademark
rights in a word the consuming public has never heard of. We must
imagine these things into being before we can make them the subject of
legal rights and obligations.
Nor is the work of imagination done at the moment of creation. We must
constantly play a game of practical metaphysics to grant legal rights over
things that can’t be seen or touched. When the legal system says that this
assembly of gears and levers infringes on that set of marks on a piece of
paper, it’s calling an abstraction into being. The “invention” that connects
the two is itself a creation of the legal mind no less than the arrangement of
parts is a creation of the engineering mind. Lawyers must decide whether a
given abstraction is an invention at all (most of us would agree that a short
story isn’t one); whether it has attributes like “new,” “useful,” “obvious,”
and so on; and what exactly its limits are. None of these distinctions come
ready-made in nature; they require continuous, purposeful, collective
imagination. Like Tinkerbell, intellectual property really would vanish if
we stopped believing in our ability to see it.
And if we must imagine intellectual property law, it must also imagine
us. Every body of law has an internal logic to it, a logic drawn from and
reflected in the social relationships it imagines among the people subject to
it. Thus, for example, Carol Rose observes that property law validates
exclusionary self-interest while also presuming that people are generally
inclined to respect each other’s claims to property; it therefore imagines a
“morality . . . not presum[ing] saintliness, but . . . not made for total
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sinners” either.1 We might similarly ask what copyright law thinks of when
it thinks of us.
This essay will give one possible answer to that question: copyright law
imagines that we are ethical2 beings, capable of being creative and of being
touched by the creativity of others, inclined to be sociable and to return
good for good. It has in mind a deontic vision of reciprocity in the authoraudience relationship. Or, more succinctly, authors and audiences ought to
respect each other.
That may sound like a platitude, but it isn’t. Everyone agrees that
authors and audiences ought to respect each other, but they come to blows
over how that respect ought to be expressed. The Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) thinks that audiences don’t respect authors
enough; the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) counters that it’s the
authors who aren’t showing enough respect for audiences. Meanwhile, free
software advocates and fans of the commons sketch pictures of respectful
exchange that look very different from the marketplace exchanges that both
the RIAA and EFF treat as normal.
We can learn some very interesting things about the state of the copyright
debate by looking closely at those disagreements. When the EFF tells the
content industries not to “sue their customers,” it’s making an ethical
argument that’s the mirror image of the content industries’ call for people to
“respect copyrights.” The arguments are the same, just directed at opposite
sides of the author-audience relationship. Compare those arguments with
the genuine radicalism in the way that some free software advocates don’t
care whether programming remains a viable profession. They see legal
restrictions on user freedoms as inherently unethical; no amount of software
produced or programmers employed could justify them.
As scholars, we should pay attention to these ethical visions, because
they are descriptively important to how people behave, because they affect
the persuasiveness of our policy arguments in the public arena, and because
they make provocative claims about what intellectual property law ought to
look like. This essay will find evidence of these visions in the language and
structure of intellectual property law, and in the rhetoric that activists use as
1. Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1900
(2007); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1849, 1866 (2007) (“[P]roperty is critically dependent on simple moral
intuitions about the importance of protecting possession against unwanted invasions . . . .”).
2. I use the term “ethical” rather than “moral” for three reasons. First, “moral rights” is
a term of art in intellectual property law, and I wish to avoid confusion. Second, “moral” has
come to have overtones of religious morality, particularly on sexual matters, whereas this
essay is about issues of good and bad in a broader, more secular sense. Third, “morality”
suggests a comprehensive view and a grounding of one’s theory of good and bad actions in a
broader theory of right and wrong. On the other hand, “ethics” suggests instead a more
specific focus on context, roles, and relationships, and is therefore closer to the issues this
essay raises. When I refer to “moral” questions or theories in this essay, it is specifically to
call attention to the fact that the overall grounding in a more complete theory of right and
wrong is at stake—or because a familiar phrase such as “moral authority” simply sounds
awkward if altered.
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they make arguments about intellectual property. These ethical visions link
copyright law’s rules to a model of how those regulated by copyright law
could and should behave.
This essay’s approach is descriptive, rather than prescriptive: it doesn’t
argue that these ethical frameworks correctly tell us what intellectual
property should look like, only that people use these frameworks to talk
about intellectual property. The approach is ethical, rather than metaethical:
it focuses on the specific rhetoric people apply to real controversies, rather
than on abstracted principles that could be applied to any issue. And the
approach is agnostic, rather than authoritative: it argues that relational
ethics is a different and interesting way to study intellectual property, not
necessarily the only or the best way.
Part I of this essay justifies the use of this “ethical vision” discourse. It
analyzes trade secret law in ethical terms, then abstracts from the example
to show how the ethical arguments involved are derived from standard
normative frames for talking about law. It then isolates the key
commitments that this way of speaking about intellectual property entails.
Part II takes up copyright law, the essay’s main focus. It argues that the
default ethical vision of copyright law contemplates authors and audiences
who participate in a respectful marketplace exchange. The relationship
isn’t symmetric—authors supply creativity, while audiences supply
money—but it is reciprocal. When people buy and sell copies of
copyrighted works at fairly negotiated prices, they’re respecting each
others’ needs and autonomy.
Part III uses the default ethical vision to illuminate some of the rhetoric
of modern arguments about copyright law. It considers four common
rhetorical clusters: “Downloading is theft,” “Don’t sue your customers,”
“Software should be free,” and “I love to share.” All four start from the
default ethical vision of copyright, but they take it in very different
directions.
Part IV then puts these rhetorics into conversation with each other. They
all have something interesting to say about the tensions copyright law faces
at the seams between different systems of production with different values.
It focuses on the challenge potentially posed by free software, Creative
Commons, and a culture of sharing to a commercial system of copyright.
This interface is sometimes depicted as a purely economic one, or as a clash
between competing consequentialist visions of society. This essay reminds
us that there’s also an ethical dimension to the interface; participants have
very different ideas of what it is to act ethically in one’s dealings with
others when there are copyrights involved.
The essay concludes by pulling the lens back and asking what larger
lessons we might draw. It connects the ethical arguments analyzed herein
to some more traditional debates in intellectual property law and policy, and
sketches a few interesting potential further avenues of research.
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I. ETHICAL VISIONS
This part develops just enough theory to demonstrate that an “ethical
vision” can provide a way of looking at intellectual property that’s neither
completely trivial nor easily reducible to one of the more conventional
approaches. It starts by giving an ethical reading of trade secret law; the
goal is to convince you that readings of this sort are interesting enough to
warrant further consideration. Having done so, it then explains how we can
employ this ethical mode of analysis without having to rip out and recreate
the usual apparatus we use to make normative arguments.
A. Trade Secret
Start with trade secret, the most explicitly moralistic field of intellectual
property. In the U.S. Supreme Court’s words, “[t]he maintenance of
standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the
broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.”3 Notice that this view
treats “commercial ethics” as distinct from “the encouragement of
invention”—and notice which comes first.
Trade secret law is full of ethical rhetoric. Its core prohibition is on the
use of “improper means” to discover secret information.4 “Improper” is a
loaded term; it has a strong overtone of intrinsic wrongfulness, impropriety,
of not behaving as one ought to. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition explicitly defines “improper means” as those “either wrongful
in themselves or wrongful under the circumstances.”5 If the only idea at
work were compliance with positive law, “tortious,” “prohibited,” or
“infringing” would work just as well. If the only idea were utilitarian
welfare maximization, “inefficient” or “wasteful” would be more apt. The
choice of “improper” gives a hint that something else is afoot.
Courts use even stronger language. They regularly speak of “commercial
morality” as a freestanding basis for protecting trade secrets.6 “Piracy”—an
ethically loaded term if ever there were one—is a frequent guest in trade
secret opinions.7 One of the major cases in the trade secret canon, E.I.
duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,8 thunders, “We introduce here
no new or radical ethic since our ethos has never given moral sanction to
3. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
4. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990) (defining
“misappropriation” in terms of using “improper means”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40(a) (1995) (prohibiting use of “means that are improper”); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 (1939) (prohibiting use of “improper means”).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
6. See MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 13.03[2][b] (1992) (collecting cases and noting
“interesting” use of “the normative ‘ought’ proposition”).
7. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Sys. Corp., No. 4:07-cv-109, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70934, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2008); Wenner Media LLC v. N. & Shell N. Am.
Ltd., No. 05 Civ. 1286 (CSH), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1925, at *13 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,
2005); Weissman v. Transcon. Printing U.S.A., Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 415, 425 (E.D. Pa.
2002); Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976).
8. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
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piracy. The market place must not deviate far from our mores.”9 This last
quotation, though admittedly not typical, is telling:
it explicitly
subordinates concerns of the “market place” to “mores.”
This isn’t just empty talk. The substance of trade secret law is also
readily explicable in ethical terms. The first major prong of improper
means is breach of confidence. The ethical case against breach of
confidence looks a lot like the ethical case against breach of contract. Pacta
sunt servanda—promises carry with them an ethical obligation.10 To break
a promise of nondisclosure is to treat the promisee as a mere object,
someone to be milked for information and then betrayed.11 It’s wrongful in
itself.
The same goes for the other major prong: espionage. The most common
techniques of espionage are already prohibited as a matter of property and
tort law. Breaking and entering, for example, is a freestanding tort and
crime. If we assume the basic morality of law’s other basic commands, the
conclusion that picking the lock on a back entrance is wrongful follows
syllogistically. Even without the legal prohibition, it violates the ethical
norm underlying property law: don’t touch what isn’t yours.12 Other
techniques of espionage involve an unhealthy curiosity about the affairs of
others; the dumpster-diver is undignified because she’s engaged in a
shameful act.13
Significantly, the ethical judgments involved are to be made with
reference to “the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and
reasonable conduct.”14 Courts look to commercial customs to learn which
practices are considered unethical.15 The standards of conduct to which
businesses will be held are ones that business people of reasonable ethical
judgment could fairly be expected to discern.16 You don’t need to go to law

9. Id. at 1016–17.
10. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 14–17 (1981).
11. See Kurt M. Saunders, The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL.
W. L. REV. 209, 229–31, 243–44 (2006) (giving Kantian analysis of breach of promise of
confidentiality).
12. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property,
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 619–27 (2008)
(discussing relationship of the moral norm of inviolability to property law).
13. Cf. Harry Wingo, Dumpster Diving and the Ethical Blindspot of Trade Secret Law,
16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 195, 213–15 (1997) (considering dumpster-diving to be so selfevidently “sleazy” as to require no explication or justification).
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939) (emphasis added).
15. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 294–96 (1998) (criticizing use of industry custom in trade
secret cases).
16. See, e.g., Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (reinstating punitive damage award against company whose president, “[w]hen asked
whether he thought raiding the dumpster and rifling through a competitor’s trash was
unethical, . . . equivocated by saying that he did not have enough information to make a
judgment on those practices”).
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school to know that sneaking into your competitor’s plant with a forged ID
badge is wrongful.
Trade secret, in short, has an ethical vision: competing businesses must
be held to a minimum standard of fair and respectful conduct.17 They ought
not commit breaches of the peace in spying on each other; they ought not
suborn each others’ employees into faithless disloyalty. In many cases, this
ethical vision is perfectly compatible with less obviously ethical
arguments—the Christopher court, for instance, gives both economic and
ethical reasons for its holding18—but the two are distinct.
Illustrating the difference, there are trade secret cases in which ethical
arguments trump their competitors. In Franke v. Wiltschek,19 for example,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an injunction
against defendants who had falsely claimed to be interested in selling the
plaintiff’s compressed washcloths in order to obtain samples they could
clone for their own competing washcloths.20 It was undisputed, however,
that the technical details of the plaintiff’s washcloths weren’t actually
secret; they were visible both in the (publicly available) washcloths
themselves, and in an expired patent.21 The court didn’t care.22
This move gives scholars fits; they argue that trade secret law serves no
useful purpose unless its protections are denied to public information.23
This disconnect shouldn’t be surprising. Put yourself in a judge’s shoes,
looking at a defendant who has clearly behaved unethically and a plaintiff
with clean hands. Now recall that the body of law you are to apply has an
avowed purpose of preventing precisely this sort of unethical conduct.
What reason is there not to step in?24
B. Ethical Visions
This is what I mean when I refer to an “ethical vision” of intellectual
property: a set of expectations about how people do and ought to behave in
connection with an information good that are linked to a set of expectations
about what the law does and ought to say. Many normative frameworks

17. Cf. Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REV.
1076, 1081 (1988) (arguing that courts in trade secret cases “are not overly analytical in their
pursuit of the ethical issue, but they espouse ethical intentions”).
18. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015–17.
19. 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953).
20. Id. at 494.
21. Id. at 500 (Frank, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 495.
23. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 358,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155167 (collecting and criticizing similar
cases).
24. Cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1626–31 (2006) (arguing that “a finding of bad faith
intent exerts excessive influence on the outcome of the multifactor test,” notwithstanding
repeated judicial statements that it is only one factor among many).
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make claims about what laws would be best.25 An ethical vision also
makes claims about what people should do beyond just “obey the law.”
That is, it earns its name by speaking to the ethics of people’s actions.
That means scholars, lawmakers, and activists can use an ethical vision to
make arguments about the ideal structure of law based on its view of
ethics—or to make arguments about ethics based on the structure of law.
These arguments often fit into well-known, standard forms familiar from
other policy debates. These forms work with any kind of underlying
normative theory, whether it be social welfare economics, democratic
political theory, Rawlsian arguments from the original position, or whathave-you. They do the rhetorical work of connecting a set of principles
with specific legal positions.
I’ll illustrate four such forms using the trade secret example and the facts
of Christopher, the famous aerial photography case.26 DuPont, the
plaintiff, was building a plant to produce methanol using a secret process.27
The defendants flew over the construction site, taking photographs.28
DuPont sued, alleging that the overflight constituted improper means.29
Significantly, the defendants’ conduct wasn’t otherwise illegal or tortious.
The process starts with justification, in which a set of normative
principles is used to argue for a legal position to a legal actor with the
authority to consider normative arguments directly. Thus, an activist might
say to a state legislature, “This behavior is [_____], so the law ought to
prohibit it.” The blank in this argument could be filled in with any sort of
normative claim—for example, it’s commonly argued that allowing
espionage gives businesses insufficient inducement to invest in creating
valuable information.30 The drafters of the Restatement (First) of Torts
filled the blank by saying that in commercial matters there’s “a general duty
of good faith and . . . liability rests upon breach of this duty.”31 Put another
way, they filled the blank in the form with an ethical claim: “This behavior
is [unethical], so the law ought to prohibit it.”
When the Christopher court applied the Restatement’s test, it was
engaged in articulation. Here, a legal actor is constrained to follow a legal
rule supplied by some authority, and turns to normative arguments to aid in
This pattern is common in statutory
giving the rule content.32
interpretation; the court asks what evils a law was intended to prevent and
interprets the law consistently with that intention. Again, the possible
25. See, e.g., William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
26. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1970).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 1014.
30. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 23.
31. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939). “Good faith” is another telling
phrase that links commercial law to commercial morality, both doctrinally and rhetorically.
32. In Christopher, that authority was the Texas Supreme Court, which had adopted the
Restatement’s rule. See Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 775 (Tex. 1958).
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arguments an advocate might make are many, but they fit the form, “The
[_____] goals of the law will be furthered by preventing this behavior.”
The Christopher court referred to the overflight as a “school boy’s trick,”33
“that which [the defendants] ought not do,”34 and “devious[].”35 By
treating these points as grounds for finding improper means, the court in
essence filled in the form to read: “The [ethical] goals of the law will be
furthered by preventing this behavior.”
Justification and articulation derive law from ethics. The process can
also function in reverse, through education. On many ethical theories, there
is at least a presumptive duty to obey the law; one learns the content of that
duty by studying the law.36 People learn important civic values, at least in
part, by studying the law. Here, the argument takes the form, “Because this
behavior violates the law, it’s [_____].” This point is implicit in
Christopher. The defendants conceded that “other illegal conduct” would
constitute improper means.37 A per se rule that illegality implies
impropriety is simply the filling in of this form to, “Because this behavior
violates the law, it’s [unethical].”
Since not everyone agrees with these lessons, the cycle ends in challenge.
Here, the gap between law and underlying principles is made explicit, and
the gap is used as a rebuke to the law. If we really cared about economic
efficiency, we wouldn’t have per se rules in antitrust law, if we really cared
about democratic legitimacy, we would have stronger campaign-finance
laws, and so on. This pattern takes the form, “This behavior isn’t [_____],
so the law should be changed.” Robert G. Bone criticizes Christopher by
arguing that its rule is unlikely to increase efficiency or improve fairness.38
When I teach Christopher, some of my students simply don’t see anything
wrongful about flying your own plane wherever you want, and think it an
outrage that trade secret law prohibits it. Their argument fills in the form
as, “This behavior isn’t [unethical], so trade secret law should be changed.”
Of course, this challenge is just an inversion of the initial justification, so
the cycle closes.
My point here isn’t to offer an extended theory of argument forms. It’s
just to show that speaking this particular ethical rhetoric doesn’t require us
to relearn our entire framework for making arguments about law. These
familiar forms work perfectly well when filled in with ethical specifics. Of
course, there are many kinds of ethical arguments. Utilitarian economics
can supply an ethical argument: it tells us to do whatever maximizes social
welfare. The Buddhist Eightfold Path, Hegelian personality theory,
Aristotelian virtue theory: whatever your favorite ethical framework may
be, it can be put to work using these forms.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 252–70 (1986).
Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1014.
See Bone, supra note 15, at 297–98.
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C. This Particular Ethical Vision
In this section, we narrow our focus again, and I want to be clear that
we’re doing so, not because other approaches are necessarily wrong, but
merely because the one we zoom in on here is particularly interesting.
We’ve already zoomed in from general normative arguments to ethical
ones, and now we look at one particular kind of ethical vision. We do so
here by isolating some interesting features of the ethical vision in our trade
secret example.
The first thing to notice is that the vision’s condemnation of espionage
and breach of confidence is deontic,39 not consequentialist.40 The
reasoning focuses on the intrinsic qualities of the act and on the ethical
qualities displayed by the person who engages in it, rather than on the
outcomes that it leads to. Breaking and entering is wrong in itself, and
ordinary business people can be expected to recognize that fact without
needing to make lengthy consequentialist analyses. Breaking your promise
to treat someone else’s information as confidential means failing to treat
that person with the respect properly owed to another moral agent; the
analysis can stop there.
The second thing to notice is that your duty not to misappropriate trade
secrets is relational; it’s really a duty to the secret’s holder because of some
ethically relevant relationship between you and her. It isn’t that the trade
secret owner has acquired an ethical right to make demands upon the world
by virtue of having created the secret. Instead, you’re under a relational
ethical duty not to do certain disrespectful things to her.
The
misappropriation of a trade secret is merely a measure of harm, and
sometimes the threshold that makes those disrespectful things legally
actionable. It’s important to specify the relevant relationships. For
breaches of confidence, the relationship is direct: it’s contractual or quasicontractual. For espionage, the relationship is oriented toward respect for
privacy and for property.41 More broadly, trade secret’s obligations are
duties owed by competitors to each other because of their relationship as
competitors.
39. I use “deontic” rather than “deontological” in keeping with this essay’s focus on
ethics rather than metaethics. I’m not primarily concerned with the validity of these ethical
claims or with the history of studying them, for which the “-ology” suffix would be
appropriate. I use “consequentialist” rather than “teleological” for similar reasons.
40. “Consequentialist” shouldn’t be mistaken for “utilitarian” or “economic,” even
though both are familiar examples of consequentialist approaches. Scholars argue bitterly
over whether economics can properly describe all the goods that make people better-off, or
whether law should improve distributional fairness at the expense of utilitarian social
welfare. These arguments—on both sides—are essentially consequentialist. This essay
stands aside from these debates; the deontic ethical arguments it analyzes part company with
consequentialist ones well before the latter ramify into distributional/utilitarian and
economic/noneconomic forms.
41. Note, for example, the enormous legal difference between photographing a device in
a competitor’s factory and reverse engineering a device sold on the open market. It may be
the same device, but one’s relationship to an owner imposes more obligations than one’s
relationship to a nonowner.
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Third, there’s a way in which one’s duties regarding trade secrets are
reciprocal. Obviously someone with a trade secret and someone with a
duty to respect it don’t stand in a symmetrical relationship. But there is a
broader claim that competing businesses owe reciprocal obligations to each
other to respect trade secrets. Note also the explicit element of reciprocity
in breach of confidence theories; the person under the duty of
confidentiality has received something—access to secret information—in
return for which it’s appropriate to place them under a corresponding
obligation. Lawrence C. Becker would call this return “fitting”: one
returns something appropriate, not necessarily the same thing.42
These three adjectives—deontic, relational, and reciprocal—characterize
the ethical vision of trade secret discussed above. Putting them all together,
we might say that trade secret law domesticates competition. Free-for-all
competition has the potential to be a dangerous, destructive force in which
competitors tear each other apart. Thus, trade secret law—as part of the
larger body of “unfair” (a word with significant moral overtones)
competition law—sets limits beyond which ethical businesses should not
go.
But note the positive component of this vision: there is a space of
positive, ethical competition. Trade secret law is as much about businesses
behaving well as it is about businesses behaving badly. When they respect
each others’ fences and keep their confidences, businesses are acting
ethically. To repeat, this is the fundamental point of an ethical vision: it
yokes the law’s prohibitions to a model of how those regulated by the law
could and should behave. Now that we have this point clearly in mind,
we’re ready to look for ethical visions elsewhere in intellectual property
law.
II. THE DEFAULT ETHICAL VISION OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The basic ethical expectation of copyright is that authors and audiences
respect each other and meet in the marketplace. Authors behave well when
they create and offer works that enrich the audience’s intellectual and
cultural lives. Audiences behave well when they offer authors the financial
support needed to engage in creative work. The exchange is commercial,
voluntary on both sides, reciprocal, and respectful. I call this the “default
ethical vision” of copyright, and this part describes two kinds of evidence
for it: the structure of the Copyright Act, and the way that courts
sometimes reason in copyright cases.
A. Structure
The structure of the Copyright Act of 1976 is simple. It vests copyright
in authors43 and gives them exclusive rights to control specified uses of
42. BECKER, supra note 36, at 107–11.
43. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 201(a) (2006).
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their works.44 It then contemplates that authors will license certain of these
uses,45 distribute physical copies of the work, or both.46 The Copyright Act
doesn’t explicitly require that these transactions be commercial, but it
clearly has commerce in mind. The first fair use factor distinguishes
commercial from noncommercial uses, and the fourth requires
consideration of the effect on the market.47 Both direct courts to preserve
the author’s ability to market her work. Many provisions of the Act
condition eligibility for an exception on noncommercial use;48 some of the
1909 Act’s exclusive rights were explicitly defined in terms of “vend[ing]”
or use “for profit.”49
The central idea here is that authors, having created original works, will
sell access to them. Since every transaction has two sides, we might also
say that audiences will ordinarily buy access. The center of this vision is
market exchange at a fair price; it’s fair because it was freely agreed upon.
This is a classic liberal vision of commerce: autonomy and fair dealing go
together to create exchanges of mutual advantage. The copyright angle is
that authors and audiences each have something distinct to offer: authors
have their originality, and audiences have the money to pay for it. The
author-audience relationship is central to this vision.
Obviously, both sides are paying each other the respect of negotiating in
good faith, rather than just trying to grab and run.50 But this positive view
of commerce is also compatible with a richer, ongoing form of respect. It
treasures the feeling of connectedness that fans feel toward their favorite
musicians, just as it treasures writers’ willingness to write books that their
fans want to read. These emotional connections make the actual purchase
of copies into a more deeply ethical act, one in which both sides are
properly attuned to each others’ wants and needs. Money is the medium of
exchange, but the exchange isn’t reducible to purely monetary terms.
Other elements of the copyright system are compatible with this vision,
which focuses on mutuality, respect, and fairness in author-audience
copyright transactions. The termination of the transfers system (like the
system of renewal rights before it) rests on the idea that some authors’
genius won’t be fully appreciated at the time of their initial creation.51 By
letting them recapture their copyrights decades later, these provisions

44. See id. § 106. I omit the United States’ limited moral rights scheme, id. § 106A,
from this description.
45. See id. § 106(4)–(6) (giving exclusive public performance and display rights); 101
(distinguishing “transfer of copyright ownership” from a “nonexclusive license”).
46. See id. §§ 106(3) (giving exclusive public distribution right); id. § 109
(contemplating that persons other than the copyright owner could become owners of copies);
id. § 202 (distinguishing transfer of rights in the copy from transfer of the copyright).
47. Id. § 107(1), (4).
48. E.g., id. §§ 108(a)(1), 110(4), 110(5)(A), 110(10), 114(f)(5)(A), 118.
49. Id. § 1 (repealed 1976).
50. The Copyright Act even explicitly protects copyright owners from involuntary
expropriation, albeit at the hands of government, rather than private parties. See id. § 201(e).
51. See id. §§ 203, 304.
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enable authors to renegotiate deals based on the “real” level of interest in
their works. The theory is economically suspect, but ethically intuitive.52
Similarly, many of the exceptions spelled out in the detailed sections of
the 1976 Copyright Act work to the benefit of specified institutions with
clear ethical goals: libraries,53 public broadcasters,54 and teachers.55 The
exceptions are carefully circumscribed, but they do tend to favor institutions
capable of “paying” for their uses with some of their capital of integrity and
respect. (One might think of some of these exceptions as a kind of
presumption: a good author would spend a little time volunteering at the
library.) Copyright misuse protects against overreaching authors who see
their audiences only as money pots to be emptied, rather than as real people
with a legitimate interest in receiving the work on fair terms.56 U.S.
government works are ineligible for copyright protection; the vision of
marketplace exchange simply doesn’t fit with the relationship between
government and citizen.57
B. Rhetoric
When deciding copyright cases, courts sometimes use language
suggestive of the default ethical vision.
Take the Bleistein58
nondiscrimination principle: that the sole measure of quality in copyright
law is the market’s willingness to pay. In the Court’s words, “Yet if they
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value[]—it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational
value[]—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.”59
This approach foregrounds and validates voluntary author-audience
exchange for money; it claims that the sale of copies of copyrighted works
is both normal and good.
The famous ambiguities of and arguments over fair use also show the
role of the default ethical vision. The name itself—fair use—is suggestive.
Some courts explicitly consider the defendant’s bad faith (for example, in
copying from a stolen manuscript).60 Some scholars argue that proper

52. Compare Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 252–53 (2003) (“[T]ermination rights aim to
correct the sorts of bad bargains that struggling authors make in desperation and, after later
success, come to regret.”), with id. at 253 n.141 (“We might well question whether
termination rights in fact help an author.”).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
54. Id. § 118.
55. Id. § 110(1).
56. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972–79 (4th Cir. 1990).
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 105.
58. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
59. Id. at 252.
60. See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478–79 (2d Cir. 2004)
(discussing weight to be placed on finding of bad faith).
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attribution is a form of respect whose presence should favor the
defendant,61 or whose absence should hurt.62
Or consider parody. A stinging parody is sympathetic from a free speech
point of view, but is it any wonder that judges steeped in a vision of respect
for authors would find such uses unacceptable in terms as much ethical as
economic? The reversed district court opinion in SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co.63 referred to the defendant’s parody of Gone With the
Wind as “unabated piracy.”64
This condemnatory trend is particularly evident in fair use cases where
the use is disreputable. Another court enjoined the use of the “Mickey
Mouse March” in a pornographic film, stating the use “in the setting
provided is such as to immediately compromise the work.”65 Another
enjoined the use of a Super Stud singing telegram costume, in part, because
its “bawdy associations . . . tarnishe[d] the ‘all-American’ image that [the
copyright owner in Superman] has labored to create and to preserve.”66
These courts treat vulgar parodic uses as unworthy of fair use defenses
precisely because they have the temerity to knock an iconic original from its
cultural pedestal.67
The debates over sampling show how ethical arguments about respect
can be made on both sides of the equation. Take the opening of Grand
Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.:68
“Thou shalt not steal.” has been an admonition followed since the
dawn of civilization. Unfortunately, in the modern world of business this
admonition is not always followed. Indeed, the defendants in this action
for copyright infringement would have this court believe that stealing is
rampant in the music business and, for that reason, their conduct here
should be excused. The conduct of the defendants herein, however,
violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also the copyright laws
of this country.69

61. See, e.g., Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87
B.U. L. REV. 41, 84–88 (2007) (proposing attribution as a fifth fair use factor).
62. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair
Use, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 51–90 (1997) (giving nonconsequentialist argument that
the moral right to attribution should override fair use concerns).
63. 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
64. Id. at 1369.
65. Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (emphasis added).
66. DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118 (N.D. Ga.
1984).
67. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (“We are not prepared to
hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a competitor’s copyrighted song, substitute
dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling
the end result a parody or satire on the mores of society.” (emphasis added)). But see
Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 275–91 (2007) (arguing that modern courts have been more
willing to find that sexualization makes a work transformative for fair use purposes).
68. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
69. Id. at 183 (quoting Exodus 20:15).
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This Puritanical fervor, singularly unreceptive to the idea that sampling
might ever be anything other than a form of theft, isn’t explicable on purely
economic terms.70 But on the other side, commentators play the respect
card when defending remix artists, whose collage-like creativity is said to
show a profound respect for the sources on which they draw.71
My favorite example of the powerful hold on the imagination that this
vision of a respectful author-audience relationship has comes from Warner
Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books,72 the Harry Potter Lexicon case.
Courtroom viewers were treated to the remarkable spectacle of both
plaintiff and defendant in or near tears on the witness stand.73 Both felt
acutely the loss of a valued, respectful relationship: the plaintiff because
her role as authoritative author was being usurped, and the defendant
because his attempt to provide a loving tribute was being rebuffed. The
intensely personal nature of the trial is a testament to the power of the
default ethical vision to shape both sides’ perception of what was at stake.
III. ETHICAL VISIONS IN ACTION
It’s now possible to examine the rhetorical work this ethical vision does
on the front lines of the copyright wars. This part looks at four clusters of
arguments made about the scope of the contemporary copyright. Each
cluster engages with the default ethical vision, but in an interestingly
different way. Educational campaigns by copyright industry associations
urging the public to “respect copyrights” embrace it unproblematically.
Surprisingly, so does the EFF’s call that the record companies should stop
“suing their customers”; the moral authority of this argument depends on
the default ethical vision. On the other hand, when free software advocates
argue that “software should be free,” they reject central premises of the
default vision. Finally, the “I love to share” rhetoric associated with
Creative Commons is interestingly ambiguous in its attitude toward it. This
part takes up these rhetorical clusters in turn.

70. Cf. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799–805, 801 n.12
(6th Cir. 2005) (offering economic argument against sampling, but falling back on Grand
Upright’s “Thou shalt not steal” language in a footnote).
71. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural
Creativity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 135, 159–60.
72. 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
73. See Anemona Hartocollis, Sued by Harry Potter’s Creator, Lexicographer Sobs on
Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at B1.
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A. “Respect Copyrights”
Over the past two decades, the music,74 movie,75 and software76
industries have devoted increasing resources to educating the public about
copyright law.77 The Software Publishers Association’s 1992 video “Don’t
Copy That Floppy,” which warned kids not to copy computer games for
each other, was an early example of the genre.78 More recently, the
Business Software Alliance (BSA) has sponsored a comic book featuring
“Garret the Ferret,” who teaches kids to ferret out piracy.79 Meanwhile, the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the RIAA have taken
their messages both to mass media80 and to the classroom.81
These educational campaigns recycle a few rhetorical tropes over and
over; they fit snugly into the default ethical vision. Start with the recurring
language of “respect.” The MPAA’s campaigns, for a time, used the
umbrella brand “Respect Copyrights.”82 Not “obey” copyright law, not
“follow the law,” but “respect”—a term with a strong overtone of dignity
and virtuous regard for others. The MPAA collaborated with the Los
Angeles area Boy Scouts to offer a “Respect Copyrights” activity patch.83
“Don’t Copy That Floppy” told kids that unauthorized copying is
“disrespectin’ all the folks who are makin’ it,” whereas when you pay for
software, “you’re sayin’ to the team / you respect what you do and what
you’re workin’ for.”84
This claim about respect fits hand-in-glove with the way the video
humanizes authors by intercutting video clips of software professionals

74. See generally Recording Industry Association of America, Tools for Parents and
Educators, http://www.riaa.com/toolsforparents.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
75. See generally Motion Picture Association of America, Anti-piracy,
http://www.mpaa.org/piracy.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
76. See generally Business Software Alliance, Anti-piracy:
Educate Others,
http://www.bsa.org/country/Anti-Piracy/Educate%20Others.aspx (last visited Mar. 24,
2009); Entertainment Software Association, Anti-piracy, http://www.theesa.com/policy/
antipiracy.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2009); Software & Information Industry Association,
Anti-Piracy: Educational Materials, http://www.siia.net/piracy/education.asp (last visited
Mar. 24, 2009).
77. See generally Tarleton Gillespie, Characterizing Copyright in the Classroom: The
Cultural Work of Anti-piracy Campaigns, 2 COMM., CULTURE, & CRITIQUE (forthcoming
2009).
78. Don’t Copy That Floppy (Software Publishers Association 1992), available at
http://video.msn.com/video.aspx?mkt=en-us&vid=5d371d69-ecc8-4c97-86b0-510abc7b9718.
79. Business Software Alliance, Copyright Crusader to the Rescue (Jan. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.playitcybersafe.com/pdfs/Curriculum-CC-2005.pdf.
80. See, e.g., Brad King, Disney’s Peer-to-Peer Pressure, WIRED, Oct. 24, 2001,
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2001/10/47806 (TV show episode); Record
Breaker, ARCHIE, no.577 (July 2007) (comic book).
81. See Gillespie, supra note 77.
82. See Respect Copyrights, http://www.respectcopyrights.com (last visited Mar. 24,
2009).
83. David Pierson, A Merit Badge that Can’t Be Duplicated, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006,
at B1.
84. See Don’t Copy That Floppy, supra note 78.
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talking about their work with the rap.85 The “Movies. They’re Worth It”
videos created by the MPAA and shown before theatrical trailers featured a
set painter and a stuntman speaking directly to the camera about the pride
they take in their work and how unauthorized copying of movies threatens
their jobs.86 It’s both an emotional appeal to one’s instinctive sense of
reciprocity and an ethical claim about the identifiable moral agents toward
whom one stands in a meaningful relationship. Other campaigns ask the
audience to imagine themselves in an author’s shoes, or to imagine that
they’ll someday mature into being authors themselves.87
The mirror image of this foregrounding of authors is the way these
campaigns simultaneously efface any participation by publishers,
distributors, and other middlemen. These middlemen may play an
economically important role in the copyright system, but they’re not
ethically salient. As A. O. Scott put it when writing about Manny the
stuntman, “The people most visibly associated with the movie business—
the studio executive with a house in the Hollywood Hills, the movie star
with a $12 million price tag and a first-look production deal—might not
elicit much sympathy.”88
Perhaps more surprisingly, these campaigns also recognize a kind of
reciprocity in the author-audience exchange. They validate fandom and
encourage enthusiasm about copyrighted works: as “Don’t Copy That
Floppy” puts it, “I know you love the game and that’s okay to do.”89 The
point of the campaigns is to channel that fandom into commercial channels
and away from uncompensated sharing. One RIAA poster explains, “True
music fans play by the rules.”90 There’s a positive vision of exchange here
alongside the negative anti-infringement one. Note that this vision,
however, depicts audiences in “[t]he traditional role of consumer, active in
its zeal but passive in terms of subsequent creation or even interpretive
defiance.”91
Now let’s complete the ethical vision by bringing law into the picture.
Take an MPAA announcement from the start of some DVDs: “You
wouldn’t steal a car. . . . You wouldn’t steal a handbag. . . . You wouldn’t
steal a television. . . . You wouldn’t steal a movie. . . . Downloading pirated
films is stealing. . . . Stealing is against the law. . . . Piracy. It’s a crime.”92
On this version of the story, copyright law unproblematically reflects the
85. Id.
86. See A. O. Scott, These Are Your Movies on Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, § 2,
at 15.
87. Gillespie, supra note 77, at 23.
88. Scott, supra note 86.
89. Don’t Copy That Floppy, supra note 78.
90. Recording Industry Association of America, Music Rules!, available at
http://www.music-rules.com/pdf/MusicRulesPoster.pdf.
91. Gillespie, supra note 77, at 44.
92. Piracy: It’s a Crime (Motion Picture Association of America 2004), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HmZm8vNHBSU. See generally Patricia Loughlan,
“You Wouldn’t Steal a Car”: Intellectual Property and the Language of Theft, 29 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 401 (2007).
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ethics of the default vision. Downloading is wrong, and it’s illegal, and
there’s no daylight between “wrong” and “illegal,” in either direction.93
The argument is simultaneously justification and education. The same
could be said of the strongly moralistic tone that came to characterize Jack
Valenti’s long anti-piracy crusade.94 Copyright was worthy of respect
because it was the law, and copyright was the law because creators deserve
respect.
And finally, in slogans like “Movies. They’re worth it,” the campaigns
push the line that a price tag tells you that what you’re getting is worth it.
Another MPAA campaign aimed at middle school students told them, “If
you don’t pay for it, you’ve stolen it.”95 These slogans conjoin three
claims: anything you get for free must be (a) no good (a factual claim), (b)
cheating an artist (an ethical claim), and (c) illegal (a legal claim).96 The
last is an example of articulation from the default ethical vision. The
equation of free and illegal is obviously false in a world of fair use and
commercial pirates, but it makes sense in an ethical framework of
marketplace exchange.
The default ethical vision, thus, tells a potentially compelling story about
copyright and media. By deploying it, the media industries are able to
make powerful ethical arguments in support of their legal and educational
claims. For reasons that should now be clear, they tend to embrace the
default vision uncritically. But their view of it is hardly the only possible
one.
B. “Don’t Sue Your Customers”
So far, it may seem as though the default ethical vision cuts only one
way: in favor of expansive copyright claims by authors. But when authors
flex their legal muscle, something very interesting happens: it becomes
possible to turn the default ethical vision against them. To see how,
consider some of the rhetoric used in response to the RIAA’s litigation
campaign against individual file sharers.
Five years into that campaign, the EFF released a report with the
provocative title “RIAA v. The People.”97 That’s also the name of an antiRIAA blog run by attorney Ray Beckerman, who represents many filesharing defendants.98 This isn’t an actual legal caption: technically, the
corporate members of the RIAA are the plaintiffs, and the defendants are
93. See also Gillespie, supra note 77.
94. See, e.g., Jack Valenti, Frey Lecture in Intellectual Property, Duke Law School:
Comments
on
the
Moral
Imperative
(Feb.
24,
2003),
available
at
http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/?match=Frey+Lecture+in+Intellectual+Property.
95. See Kathleen Sharp, Laying Down Copyright Law—To Children, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 25, 2004, at A19.
96. See Gillespie, supra note 77, passim.
97. ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: FIVE YEARS LATER (2008), available
at http://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf.
98. See Recording Industry vs. The People, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
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individuals. But at 30,000 lawsuits and counting,99 the name captures
something important about the litigation, and tweaks it in a
propagandistically effective way. It’s a piece of clever counter-articulation:
an argument is that the RIAA is using its legal rights in a manner
inconsistent with the ethical vision underlying those rights.
Let’s look at some of the rhetorical tropes involved. First, anti-RIAA
advocates humanize their position by pointing to particularly sympathetic
targets of the litigation campaign: twelve-year-olds,100 computer-illiterate
grandmothers,101 the homeless,102 transplant patients,103 and the dead.104
This may or may not be a financially sensible litigation strategy,105 but it
has been a public-relations disaster. Downhill Battle, a nonprofit advocacy
group, gave out stickers telling consumers not to buy CDs that “[f]und
[l]awsuits [a]gainst [c]hildren and [f]amilies.”106
Similarly, these campaigns use audiences’ status as “fans” to provide
moral authority. The group Prince Fans United formed to resist copyright
claims by the artist once again known as Prince,107 or, in their words, “to
fight back to what amounts to an injustice to the fansites and the very fans
who have supported Prince’s career, many since the very beginning nearly
thirty years ago.”108 Here, their long and passionate commercial
engagement with Prince is presented as the source of their ethical claim
against him. At other times, the rhetoric of fandom is deployed to excuse
file sharers, whose only “crime” is loving music too much. As the EFF
asks, “Tired of the entertainment industry treating you like a criminal for
wanting to share music and movies online?”109

99. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 97, at 1.
100. See Sam Diaz, Recording Industry in a Bind, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 15,
2003, at 1E.
101. See Benny Evangelista, Download Lawsuit Dismissed: RIAA Drops Claim that
Grandmother Stole Online Music, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 2003, at B1.
102. See Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Berry, No. 07 Civ. 1092(HB)(KNF), 2008 WL
1320969, at *4 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2008).
103. See Teen Transplant Candidate Sued over Music Downloads, WTAE-TV, Dec. 1,
2008, http://www.thepittsburghchannel.com/news/18160365/detail.html.
104. See Recording Industry vs. The People, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.
com/2006/08/riaa-wants-to-depose-dead-defendants.html (Aug. 13, 2006, 9:25 PM).
105. Compare Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers, and Other Good
Targets for the Recording Industry’s File Sharing Litigation, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
133 (2006) (stating that lawsuits are cost-justified), with Eric Bangeman, RIAA Anti-P2P
Campaign a Real Money Pit, According to Testimony, ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 2, 2007,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071002-music-industry-exec-p2p-litigation-is-a-moneypit.html (stating that lawsuits are a money-losing proposition).
106. See Scott Kirsner, Downhill Battle Wages Uphill Fight vs. Music Industry, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2005, at C1.
107. See Mireya Navarro, Pout and Shout, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, § 9, at 1.
108. See Press Release, Prince Fans United, Prince Fans Fight Back Against Attacks
(Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.princefansunited.com/pfu_press_release.pdf
(emphasis added).
109. Electronic Frontier Foundation, File Sharing, http://www.eff.org/issues/file-sharing
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
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In addition to innocents and fans, these campaigns also describe
audiences as “customers.” The EFF calls the recording industry’s lawsuits
“an unprecedented legal campaign against its own customers”110 and has
been using variants of this phrase—especially “suing your customers”—for
years.111 That’s an interesting choice of words; being a “customer” doesn’t
ordinarily give one a special ethical claim not to be sued.112 But it makes
sense in terms of the default ethical vision, which prizes commercial
exchange. By depicting audiences as “customers,” it’s possible to make an
argument that they’re carrying out their side of this particular ethical
bargain.
There’s also a closely related claim that audiences remain ready to pay
for music on fair terms. As the EFF says, “Music fans today deserve the
same opportunity to pay a fee for the freedom to download the music they
love.”113 Thus, the EFF’s “better way forward”—voluntary collective
licensing—is, in essence, a request to authors to return to the bargaining
table and negotiate in good faith for a different arrangement that would let
audiences continue to express their appreciation for creators’ works, albeit
with a different financial channel back to creators.114 The EFF emphasizes
both that the arrangement should be voluntary and that audiences would pay
if terms were fair.115 Similarly, many calls for new business models for
musicians aren’t just claims about the economics of music;116 they also
uphold a positive vision of mutual enthusiasm in which the musician and
the audience feed off of each other’s energy.117
Meanwhile, these campaigns foreground and excoriate the record
industry.118 Consider complaints about record industry price-fixing, a
110. Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People, http://www.eff.org/riaa-vpeople (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
111. See, e.g., Katie Dean, RIAA Sues 80 More Swappers, WIRED, Oct. 30, 2003,
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2003/10/61028 (quoting EFF attorney
Fred von Lohmann as saying, “Suing your customers one at a time is not a business
model.”); see also G. Richard Shell, Suing Your Customers: A Winning Business Strategy?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Oct. 22, 2003, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?
articleid=863; Fred von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea?, LAW.COM, Sept.
29, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1095434496352.
112. Indeed, stores prosecute shoplifters all the time, and the obvious rejoinder is
precisely that downloaders are being sued precisely because they’re not being “customers,”
but are instead helping themselves for free. But notice how this rejoinder itself concedes the
illegitimacy of suing actual customers.
113. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 97, at 14.
114. See FRED VON LOHMANN, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., A BETTER WAY FORWARD:
VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE LICENSING OF MUSIC FILE SHARING (2008), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/eff-a-better-way-forward.pdf.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Chris Anderson, Free! Why $0.00 Is the Future of Business, WIRED, Feb.
25, 2008, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/16-03/ff_free?currentPage=all.
117. See Clive Thompson, Sex, Drugs and Updating Your Blog, N.Y TIMES, May 13,
2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 42 (calling online author-audience relationship “symbiotic”).
118. See, e.g., Danny Colligan, RIAA = Evil, GEO. INDEP., Mar. 28, 2007,
http://media.www.thegeorgetownindependent.com/media/storage/paper136/news/2007/03/2
8/Commentary/Riaa-Evil-2808823.shtml.
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practice that visibly undermines the voluntary bargaining at the heart of the
default ethical vision.119 Or consider some of the arguments against digital
rights management (DRM). It spies on users;120 it misuses their
computers.121 Both are inconsistent with respect for user autonomy; neither
is part of the core money-for-access trade envisaged by the default vision.
Every time a music retailer shuts down and turns off its DRM server, it’s
withdrawing unilaterally from what should have been a long-term respectful
relationship.122
Vilifying the record industry has another rhetorical benefit. By
portraying the record companies as intermeddling usurpers and musicians
as additional victims of this heartless cartel, groups like Downhill Battle
can depict the struggle against industry lawsuits as consistent with the
larger vision of author-audience collaboration.123 As Courtney Love puts it,
“What is piracy? Piracy is the act of stealing an artist’s work without any
intention of paying for it. I’m not talking about Napster-type software. I’m
talking about major label recording contracts.”124
The trickiest piece of the argument to finesse is the lawsuits themselves.
After all, it’s inherent in modern copyright law that copyright owners have
the right to bring suit against infringers. Some activists engage in critique:
if the law allows lawsuits against fans, the law is an ass.125 Others, like
Beckerman, engage in articulation, seeking to use these ethical principles as
anchors for convincing legal arguments.126 Still others, like the EFF, make
their appeal directly to copyright owners: even if you have a legal right to
do it, what you are doing is wrong, and you should stop. The default ethical
vision, with its positive vision of the author-audience relationship, is the
ethical baseline from which all of these claims start. Note, by way of
119. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Class Action Lawsuit Filed Against Music Industry, ARS
TECHNICA, Mar. 13, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060313-6368.html; see
also Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale & Kim Weatherall, Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust
Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 519
(2002).
120. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996).
121. See generally Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of
the Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157
(2007) (discussing unknowingly installed software).
122. See, e.g., Posting of Cory Doctorow to BoingBoing, http://boingboing.net/2008/
09/26/walmart-shutting-dow.html (Sept. 26, 2008, 8:34 PM) (“Well, they’re repaying your
honesty by taking away your music.”).
123. See Downhill Battle Presents the Reasons, http://www.downhillbattle.org/reasons/
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
124. Courtney Love, Speech at the Digital Hollywood Online Entertainment Conference
(May 16, 2000), available at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14/love/.
125. See, e.g., Jon Lebkowsky, The Pirate Party:
Rethinking Copyright,
WORLDCHANGING, Aug. 22, 2006, http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/004848.html
(describing Pirate Party of Sweden, which believes that all noncommercial copying should
be legal).
126. See, e.g., Ray Beckerman, Large Recording Companies v. The Defenseless: Some
Common Sense Solutions to the Challenges of the RIAA Litigations, JUDGES’ J., Summer
2008, available at http://www.abanet.org/jd/publications/jjournal/2008summer/Beckerman.pdf.
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contrast, that almost no one contests the legitimacy of actions against
unlicensed CD pressing plants.
The overall vision of copyright law here, therefore, is that copyright law
is being abused by copyright owners seeking unfair domination over
audiences. Despite all that, the basic deal—money for creative works—is
sound and remains an ethical ideal. The business models and the specifics
of copyright law will need to be tweaked, but they can be.
Thus, the RIAA’s rhetoric and the EFF’s rhetoric have more in common
than one might expect. They both largely accept the default ethical vision
of copyright: an ideal frame of mutual respect, fair dealing, and
commercial exchange. Neither contests that each side owes the other some
obligations, and they both agree that copyright law should act to implement
this ethical vision. Where they part company is in where they assign blame
for its breakdown: each side blames the other for not negotiating in good
faith. The default ethical vision is flexible enough to be compatible with
both stories.
Isn’t this just the continuation of negotiation by other means? Creators
and consumers would each like to adjust the terms of their relationship to
favor themselves, and will turn to whatever rhetorical tools come to hand.
Yes, but notice that in these disputes, both sides accept that there is a
contract whose general outlines are clear. This isn’t crazy talk; it fits with
how people think about creative works in everyday life. You feel good
about buying music from a band you like; you hope that they feel
appreciated. That sense of reciprocity doesn’t just drive people’s behavior;
it also drives the law.
C. “Software Should Be Free”
There are more radical critiques out there, the most famous of which is
associated with the free software movement.127 Free software ideology is
complex and contested, so I focus on Richard Stallman, the founder of the
Free Software Foundation (FSF) and leading free software advocate.
Stallman’s frustration with a buggy printer he could not patch because
Xerox would not make the necessary source code available turned into a
personal crusade for user rights.128 He and the FSF are now the center of
both a large and diffuse community of programmers and of a politically
active social movement. Stallman’s initial critique was limited to
software;129 he subsequently expanded it to include software manuals;130

127. Here, I particularly wish to emphasize that I’m describing rhetorical clusters. There
are allegedly as many views of free software as there are free software developers. I’m
describing features that much of their rhetoric has in common, rather than claiming that I’m
depicting a complete and coherent set of claims made by any particular institution.
128. See generally SAM WILLIAMS, FREE AS IN FREEDOM: RICHARD STALLMAN’S CRUSADE
FOR FREE SOFTWARE (2002).
129. See Richard Stallman, GNU Project, Why Software Should Be Free (Apr. 24, 1992),
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/shouldbefree.html.
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other activists have extended it to nonfunctional, expressive works.131 Let’s
examine a few of the rhetorical and ethical moves that lead them all to
reject the default ethical vision of copyright.
The first, basic claim is that user rights over software are a matter of
“freedom.” In the FSF’s famous formulation, “Free software is a matter of
liberty, not price. To understand the concept, you should think of free as in
free speech, not as in free beer.”132 This rhetorical orientation links free
software to liberal values133 and gives it an explicitly ethical tone missing
from talk of “open source.”134 On this story, individual autonomy is a
fundamental value, and it requires control over the software one runs on
one’s own computer.135 You need to be able to choose which software to
run, and which software not to run.
Given this starting point, it’s wrongful to place restrictions on how
people use or modify software; if you do, you’re taking away an “essential
freedom.”136 Such restrictions come in many forms. The most basic
consists of withholding source code. You can’t easily understand how a
program works or modify it without the source code, and since those
freedoms are essential, “accessibility of source code is a necessary
condition for free software.”137 There’s no positive obligation to give
anyone else any software at all, but giving them software without the
corresponding source code is disrespectful because it treats their freedoms
in the software as less important than your own. Thus, source-code secretkeeping is an unethical act. Stallman refers to nondisclosure agreements as
“betrayal” because they constitute “promise[s] to refuse to cooperate with
just about the entire population of the planet Earth.”138
This view is also evident in places like the Defective by Design antiDRM campaign and the FSF’s broadsides against “Treacherous
Computing.” DRM systems that answer to their creators, rather than their

130. See Free Software Foundation, Free Software and Free Manuals,
ttp://www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/free-doc.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
131. See, e.g., Definition of Free Cultural Works, http://freedomdefined.org/Definition
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
132. GNU Project, The Free Software Definition, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/freesw.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
133. See E. Gabriella Coleman & Alex Golub, Hacker Practice: Moral Genres and the
Cultural Articulation of Liberalism, 8 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 255 (2008).
134. See Richard Stallman, GNU Project, Why “Open Source” Misses the Point of Free
Software, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.html (last visited
Mar. 24, 2009).
135. See SAMIR CHOPRA & SCOTT D. DEXTER, DECODING LIBERATION: THE PROMISE OF
FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 40 (2007).
136. GNU Project, supra note 132.
137. Id. (stating that “access to the source code is a precondition” for two out of four
essential freedoms).
138. See WILLIAMS, supra note 128, at 7, 21. In person, Stallman is fond of humanizing
the “victims” of this betrayal by pointing at individual audience members and saying that the
nondisclosing programmer betrayed “you, too.” Id. at 21.

GRIMMELMANN FINAL

2009]

ETHICAL VISIONS OF COPYRIGHT LAW

3/30/2009 10:08:14 PM

2027

users, limit what users can do with their own computers.139 They therefore
directly prevent the exercise of essential freedoms, which makes their use
unethical.140 Note that this is a stronger critique than the one we saw
above, which criticized only the use of DRM to exact unfair concessions
from consumers. Here, by contrast, the claim is that DRM is a product with
no ethical uses.
The most pointed critique is saved for legal restrictions. In Stallman’s
words, “When a program has an owner, the users lose freedom to control
part of their own lives.”141 This isn’t just an argument against software
copyright policy; it’s also an argument about how programmers ought to
behave. Stallman again: “[A]n ethical software developer will reject the
option” of using copyright to control software.142 This ethical obligation
trumps the “temptation” of “practical advantage.”143 Indeed, one has an
ethical obligation not to assert software copyrights, even if that means one
can’t make a living as a programmer. Stallman is perfectly up-front in
accepting that a world of free software may be a world with fewer
programmers.144 If you can’t be an author and ethical too, it’s better not to
be an author at all.
Copyright law, to the extent that it gives authors the tools they need to
carry out this oppression, is complicit in their unethical behavior. Since
copyright inherently is a right to exclude—that is, a right to prevent use—it
may therefore be beyond redemption. The free software critique is thus a
radical one. It sees copyright law itself as an obstacle to a truly ethical
system of intellectual production. Stallman has stated that “the law should
conform to ethics, not the other way around.”145
What’s an ethical programmer to do, then? That’s where free software
licenses come in. An author who uses a free software license gives up the
option of using copyright to prevent users from exercising their essential
freedoms.146 We could describe the FSF’s General Public License
(GPL)147 and other free software licenses as a clever, necessary act of
jujitsu. One needs free licenses to act ethically as an author within the
broader, broadly unethical copyright system. They enable one to live
139. See, e.g., Richard Stallman, GNU Project, Can You Trust Your Computer?,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
140. See Peter Brown, Defective by Design, What Is DRM? Digital Restrictions
Management, http://www.defectivebydesign.org/what_is_drm (last visited Mar. 24, 2009)
(“Unfree software implementing DRM technology is simply a prison in which users can be
put . . . .”).
141. Richard Stallman, GNU Project, Why Software Should Not Have Owners,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-free.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
142. See Stallman, supra note 129.
143. Stallman, supra note 134 (emphasis altered).
144. See Stallman, supra note 129.
145. Id.
146. See generally GNU Project, Various Licenses and Comments About Them,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/license-list.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
147. GNU Project, GNU General Public License, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009) [hereinafter GPL].
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without doing harm to audiences, but they don’t make the system itself
acceptable.
E. Gabriella Coleman has documented how the Debian free software
project educates its programmers to think about license choice issues in
explicitly ethical terms.148 One might use a maximally permissive license
on the theory that it maximizes user freedom.149 Or one might use a
“copyleft” license like the GPL, which requires licensees who modify the
program—and thereby become authors themselves—to grant the same
freedoms to their own audiences.150 The FSF’s official position is that
using a noncopyleft license is “not doing wrong,” but that it’s “not the best
way to promote users’ freedom.”151
The ethical picture that emerges is deontic, relational, reciprocal, and
respectful. It’s okay not to program, and it’s okay not to share programs at
all, but once you do share, it’s obligatory to share the source code as
well.152 That obligation is triggered the moment you enter into an authoraudience relationship with someone else.153 Copyleft then relates that
obligation to your own receipt of software; the GPL makes you share
source code because someone else shared it with you. Authors show
respect by not trying to take away audiences’ rights; audiences ought to
show respect for authors, but oughtn’t be compelled to do so. Centrally for
our purposes, free software licenses in general are incompatible with the
default ethical vision of commercial exchange, and copyleft licenses go
further by restraining downstream authors from taking part in the
commercial exchange system as well.154
One might object that there’s no explicit conflict. The FSF doesn’t
complain about the sale of software itself, only about restrictions on postsale use,155 and the GPL allows programmers to charge for a copy of the
software.156 On this view, it sounds as though asking to be paid for one’s
work isn’t ethically problematic in itself. That’s true, and the distinction is
significant, but still, it only goes so far. Imagine an abolitionist telling a

148. See E. Gabriella Coleman, Three Ethical Moments in Debian 49 (Sept. 15, 2005)
(unpublished draft), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
805287.
149. See CHOPRA & DEXTER, supra note 135, at 49–50.
150. Id.; see also GNU Project, What Is Copyleft?, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/
copyleft.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
151. See GNU Project, Why Copyleft?, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/whycopyleft.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
152. This may be one situation in which “commons” rhetoric, discussed infra Part III.D,
is actually more demanding, since it suggests that there is a positive ethical obligation to
share and to contribute to humanity’s common pool of knowledge.
153. See GPL, supra note 147.
154. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 63–67 (2007).
155. See GNU Project, Selling Free Software, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/selling.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
156. See GPL, supra note 147 (“You may charge any price or no price for each copy that
you convey . . . .”).
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plantation owner that there’s nothing wrong with the sale of cotton for
money, only with the legal system of slavery backing it up.
It’s precisely the legal restrictions on post-sale use that conventional
copyright theory depends on to keep the price from dropping to zero. If the
threat to enforce those restrictions is unethical and therefore off the table,
the default ethical vision’s favorite system of exchange falls apart.
Patronage, commissions, and tip jars are available models in a world
without exclusive rights, but not an above-marginal-cost market for copies.
The default ethical vision of copyright doesn’t hold together without
authors’ exclusive rights in copyrighted works to mirror audiences’
exclusive rights in their money.
D. “I Love to Share”
It’s against that backdrop that we should seek to understand the sharing
rhetoric of Creative Commons. Like a free software license, a Creative
Commons license works within the superstructure of copyright law’s
system of entitlements; it takes as given the initial legal grant of rights to
authors, but offers them a way to relinquish some of those rights by sharing
their works freely with audiences. Other, similar rhetoric comes from
Wikipedia and other Wikimedia projects—particularly the Wikimedia
Commons—which try to rely on voluntary authorial contributions (among
others) to build up a rich stock of material for audiences. Eric Johnson’s
Konomark is to the same effect: a voluntary symbol a creator can apply to
a work to invite a conversation about possible free reuse.157 Let’s look at
how they make their case.
The first word that’s everywhere is “share.” Creative Commons’
homepage proclaims, “Share, Remix, Reuse—Legally”;158 it sells t-shirts
with the slogan “I love to share”;159 its copyleft license option is named
“Share Alike.”160 “Share” is an evocative word; it suggests the innocent
generosity of children, as well as thoughtfulness about others. That’s why
some hackers use the phrase “share and enjoy!” when they give away
software,161 and why Stallman’s “Free Software Song” begins, “Join us
now and share the software.”162 It’s also why Eric S. Raymond refers to
these practices as a “gift culture.”163
157. See Konomark, http://www.konomark.org/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
158. Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Feb 19, 2009).
159. Creative Commons, I Love to Share, http://support.creativecommons.org/store/
ilovetoshare (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
160. Creative
Commons,
Attribution-Share
Alike
3.0
Unported,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
161. The Jargon File (version 4.4.7), Share and Enjoy!, http://www.catb.org/~esr/jargon/
html/S/Share-and-enjoy-.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
162. Richard
Stallman,
GNU
Project,
The
Free
Software
Song,
http://www.gnu.org/music/free-software-song.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
163. ERIC S. RAYMOND, Homesteading the Noosphere, in THE CATHEDRAL AND THE
BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 65,
80–82 (rev. ed. 2001).

GRIMMELMANN FINAL

2030

3/30/2009 10:08:14 PM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

This last formulation emphasizes the idea of sharing as altruism: a
voluntary decision to do something nice for others. The Creative Commons
blog archives are replete with stories of “featured commoners” who created
something and then used a Creative Commons license to share it freely with
Wikipedia barnstars for valued contributors similarly
audiences.164
recognize outstanding sharing.165 The ethical view here is that authors who
choose to share are treating their audience with generosity and respect, and
we ought to praise them for it.
The second omnipresent word is “commons,” which summons up
pictures of unenclosed fields open to all. The name “Creative Commons”
appropriates this ideal of a shared, uncontrolled resource and harnesses it to
a vision of thriving creativity by tapping into a thriving academic discourse
about the intellectual commons: a large pool of works on which anyone is
free to draw.166 The idea emphasizes sequential, incremental creativity:
“[T]he new always builds on the old,” as Larry Lessig puts it.167 The logo
of the Students for Free Culture organization uses interlocked toy bricks to
emphasize this “building” idea,168 a visual metaphor that Creative
Commons also employs.
This way of thinking about the “commons” emphasizes the (mediated)
relationship of contribution to the commons so that others can draw from it
and the reciprocity of allowing others to build on your own works in turn.
In so doing, it breaks down some of the division between author and
audience we saw in the default vision.169 Without a clear flow of money,
it’s harder to type someone based on whether they pay or are paid. Instead,
individuals are seen as moving back and forth; engaging with works both as
appreciative audience and recasting derivative author. Wikipedia defines
itself as the encyclopedia that “anyone can edit”170; that is, every reader is
also a potential author. Linus’s Law, “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are
shallow,” emphasizes that every user of open source software is also a
potential developer.171 Fittingly, the Share Alike logo is a circular arrow;
what goes around comes around.
164. See, e.g., Creative Commons, Featured Commoners: Severed Fifth (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/10174.
165. See PHEOBE AYERS ET AL., HOW WIKIPEDIA WORKS: AND HOW YOU CAN BE A PART
OF IT 333–34 (2008).
166. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, VIRAL SPIRAL: HOW THE COMMONERS BUILT A DIGITAL
REPUBLIC OF THEIR OWN (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF
THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 33.
167. Lawrence Lessig, Copyright Law and Roasted Pig, RED HERRING, Oct. 21, 2002,
http://www.redherring.com/Home/10259.
168. FreeCulture.org, http://freeculture.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
169. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004).
170. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
171. Despite its name, “Linus’s Law” was coined by Eric S. Raymond. See ERIC S.
RAYMOND, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, in THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS
ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 163, at 19, 30.
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Another frequent trope is that of “community.”172 There’s a reason that
“community site” is a web 2.0 buzzword for anything with communicative
user-generated content features: people who create and share freely with
each other aren’t just taking part in arms-length transactions; they’re
building social institutions.173 Yochai Benkler and Helen Nissenbaum give
a virtue-ethics analysis of this phenomenon. For them, deeper principles of
autonomy, democracy, and mutual respect are furthered by a culture of
mutual sharing—and participation in such a culture teaches individuals how
to be virtuous.174
To summarize, then, “commons” and “sharing” rhetoric prizes voluntary
authorial contributions to a pool on which anyone is free to draw. These
tropes help tell a story about how people depend on the commons, so that
placing material into the commons becomes an ethical act. It also helps
create bonds of respect, honor, and enthusiasm between authors and grateful
audiences—as well as fueling future repetitions of this exchange as
audiences become authors themselves who, in turn, share with the
commons, and so on. Like the default ethical vision, this view explains
how authors and audiences can behave ethically toward each other—but it
does so in a way perhaps less fraught with obligation.
IV. IS SHARING RADICAL?
We now have four ethical scripts on the table, four clusters of common
arguments about copyright that have some interesting ethical content. Let’s
see if we can situate them in relation to each other.
To recap, I’ve argued that there’s a default ethical vision in copyright law
of market exchange, and that both the “respect copyrights” story and its
“don’t sue your customers” counterstory subscribe to that vision in at least
its basic form. The “software should be free” rhetoric of the free software
movement, by comparison, claims that this vision itself is flawed. The
exclusive rights that make it practically possible are so deeply wrong that
the vision itself should be scrapped. This critique treats as unethical authors
who sell copies of their works while retaining copyright control—the basic
act that the default vision treats as the paradigm of proper behavior.
We might ask, then, where “I love to share” fits into this vision. Does it
belong inside the copyright system, or outside of it? Is it compatible with
commercial relationships, or opposed to them? Does it believe that authors
who sell their works are behaving ethically or unethically? As we shall see,
the answers to these questions are deeply ambiguous.

172. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY 222–24 (2008).
173. See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 25–54 (2008).
174. Yochai Benkler & Helen Nissenbaum, Commons-Based Peer Production and Virtue,
14 J. POL. PHIL. 394 (2006).
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A. Inside or Outside?
A Creative Commons license formally functions within the
superstructure of copyright law’s system of entitlements; it takes as given
the initial legal grant of rights to authors, but offers them a way to
relinquish some of those rights.
There is therefore no structural
incompatibility between sharing and copyright law; authors with copyrights
can choose to share just as freely as authors without them. Indeed, one
might even argue that the choice to share is more ethically meaningful when
it involves a genuine relinquishment of known rights.
On the other hand, think again about the GPL jujitsu. From a free
software perspective, a first-best world would have no software copyrights.
In this imperfect world where software can be copyrighted, the GPL carves
out, in effect, a copyright-free zone. That zone internally functions like a
copyright-free world. Formal compatibility with copyright’s rules doesn’t
tell us whether a licensing system should be read as implementing or
opposing the copyright system.
B. Commercial or Noncommercial?
One might argue that sharing and commerce can be friends. Larry
Lessig’s explanation for Creative Commons emphasizes that copyright is a
one-size-fits-all system that gives the same rights to commercial and
noncommercial authors.175 Professionals can use their exclusive rights to
form respectful relationships on the default vision; amateurs can waive
those rights and form respectful relationships within a sharing model. Thus,
Creative Commons enables happy, peaceful, voluntary coexistence between
what Lessig calls “read-only” commercial culture and “read-write” sharing
culture.176
Indeed, it’s possible to go further and argue that sharing enhances
commerce. Shaving companies give away the razor and sell the blades;
musicians give away the single and sell the album. Chris Anderson offers a
taxonomy of business models built around giving things away for free, all
of which are built around some alternative stream of revenue from
audiences back to authors.177 This is a vision of sharing that’s completely
seamless with the default ethical vision; sharing and selling are
complementary forms of engagement between author and audience.
Then again, there’s another way to look at Eric S. Raymond’s positive
vision of altruistic programmer communities, the Free Culture movement’s
praise for self-sufficient creative communities, and Creative Commons’
promotion of vibrant, growing pools of openly licensed material. They
provide practical concrete models of how noncommercial creativity is
sustainable, how payment is unnecessary to the ethical accumulation of
175. See generally LESSIG, supra note 172, at 28–31.
176. Id.
177. See Anderson, supra note 116.
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large bodies of creative works by audiences, and how the author-audience
divide itself is unnecessary. All of these undermine assumptions made by
the default ethical vision about how the creative process functions and, in so
doing, undermine its ethical claims about how the author-audience divide
must be mediated to be ethical. To the extent that sharing demonstrates an
entirely nonmonetary model of intellectual and cultural production, it
thereby implicitly calls into question the necessity of selling at all—and
might therefore be heard to say that there’s something wrong with selling.
C. Authorial Choice or Audience Freedom?
Niva Elkin-Koren has argued that Creative Commons’ strategic choice to
depend on purely voluntary licensing leads to an “ideological fuzziness.”178
Benjamin Mako Hill adds that refusing to draw a “line in the sand” of
minimal audience rights means Creative Commons can’t “represent even
[a] minimal attachment to any defined spirit of sharing.”179 Commentators
have questioned whether terms in the Attribution license permit authors to
exercise dangerous downstream vetoes,180 whether Creative Commons’
anti-DRM clauses sufficiently deal with the threat of technical lockup,181
and whether its Sampling licenses restrict what should be fundamental
freedoms of noncommercial sharing.182 Even the Noncommercial licenses
are not “free” because, in the words of the Debian Free Software
Guidelines, they limit the freedom to use the work “for any purpose” and
“discriminate[] against fields of endeavor.”183
On this view, Creative Commons tells authors that grasping control is as
acceptable a choice (legally and ethically) as choosing to share is. By
telling authors that they can choose which license to use—or choose not to
use one—it merely legitimates the legal structures that give them those
rights in the first place.184 The complaint, in essence, is that Creative
Commons reinforces the default ethical vision.

178. See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Can’t Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377 (2005).
179. Posting of Benjamin Mako Hill to Advogado, http://www.advogato.org/
article/851.html (July 29, 2005, 19:18 UTC).
180. See Evan Prodromou, Debian Creative Commons Workgroup Report (Aug. 10,
2006), http://evan.prodromou.name/Debian_Creative_Commons_Workgroup_Report.
181. See Terry Hancock, Debian and the Creative Commons, FREE SOFTWARE MAGAZINE,
Oct. 18, 2006, http://www.freesoftwaremagazine.com/columns/debian_and_the_creative_
commons.
182. See Posting of Lawrence Lessig to Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/
weblog/entry/7520 (June 4, 2007).
183. See
Prodromou,
supra
note
180;
Debian
Social
Contract,
http://www.debian.org/social_contract (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
184. See Anna Nimus, Subsol, Copyright, Copyleft and the Creative Anti-Commons,
http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors0/nimustext.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) (“The
Creative Commons mission of allowing producers the ‘freedom’ to choose the level of
restrictions for publishing their work contradicts the real conditions of commons-based
production.”).
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On the other hand, “sharing” language has a natural affinity to stronger
claims about “freedom.” At least within the free software community,
visions of wide-scale collaborative sharing are not ideologically neutral.
Instead, these theories are coupled with the critique of proprietary software:
this is wrong, and there’s a better way. When Stallman first criticized
Xerox’s refusal to share the printer code, he could draw upon his experience
in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Artificial Intelligence Lab,
where programmers freely shared code as they hacked on systems for
mutual benefit, to offer a vision of why things didn’t need to be that way.185
Sharing’s ideal of healthy author-audience relations can serve as a telling
contrast to the free software critique of the ethically deficient authoraudience relationships inherent in proprietary software.
In much the same way, the rhetoric of “sharing” and the “commons” can
function as a natural correlative to protests about overreaching uses of
copyright by authors. Even if Creative Commons itself studiously avoids
criticizing authors who don’t choose Creative Commons, others need not be
so shy. That’s where the Definition of Free Cultural Works goes when it
says that cultural works “should be free.”186 Authors who put restrictions
on copying or reuse are doing something wrong. Authors who share their
works are doing something right. These two claims fit naturally together in
critiquing the default view.
D. Who’s Afraid of Creative Commons?
The heart of the issue, then, is that we can read “sharing” either as being
allied with the default ethical vision or as allied with the free-as-in-freedom
critique of that vision. The default ethical vision seizes on sharing’s
generosity, its praise of voluntary engagement, and its refusal to condemn.
The critique, on the other hand, points to sharing’s nonmonetary nature and
its implicit rebuke of nonsharers. Both readings represent plausible,
consistent extensions of sharing’s logic.
This fact has important consequences. It explains some of the (otherwise
surprising) unease around the Creative Commons project and why people
have criticized it from both sides. We saw above how some critics believe
it lacks an agenda and needs one, but there are also people who see in it a
hidden agenda for abolishing copyright.187 These two critiques can’t both
be right. They can, however, both sound plausible—because Creative
Commons’ “sharing” rhetoric is so ambiguous.

185. See WILLIAMS, supra note 128, at 7–10.
186. Definition of Free Cultural Works, supra note 131.
187. See, e.g., Brad Holland, The Copy Left Is Not Right, AIGA, Feb. 8, 2005,
http://www.aiga.org/content.cfm/the-copy-left-is-not-right;
Illustrators’
Partnership,
Alternative Copyright Gains Ground in Europe, ILLUSTRATORSPARTNERSHIP.ORG, Feb. 9,
2005,
http://www.illustratorspartnership.org/01_topics/article.php?searchterm=00189
(“[Creative Commons] is intended to act as a copyright ‘virus,’ infecting traditional
copyright protections throughout society.”).
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This ambiguity also provides an explanation for some (otherwise
puzzling) critiques of Creative Commons that seem to veer over the line
into saying that authors who use Creative Commons licenses are doing
something wrong. A Billboard article from 2005 quotes an AIDS-stricken
musician as saying he wouldn’t have been able to afford his medication if
he had used a Creative Commons license: “No one should let artists give
up their rights.”188 This particular critique was factually misinformed,189
but there is an important intuition underlying it.
If Creative Commons is part of a broader critique of the default ethical
vision, then it makes a set of ethical claims that authors who write for
money and sell their works are behaving unethically. For people who are
part of that system—who see themselves as acting ethically when they sell
their works—this critique is either incomprehensible, crazy, or profoundly
dangerous. Just as the RIAA warns kids that “free” music must be illegal
and unethical, there’s a hint of an idea here that authors who choose
Creative Commons are betraying other authors and their audiences—they
aren’t showing the audience enough respect to give them something worth
paying for.190
To summarize, there’s a significant ambiguity in Creative Commons’
response to the copyright system. It could be saying (or could be seen to
say) that the system is out of balance because authors have exclusive rights
they don’t need and don’t want to use. It could also be saying (or could be
seen to say) that the system is out of balance because authors have
exclusive rights they shouldn’t have and shouldn’t be allowed to use. In
either frame, its licensing strategy is a natural response designed to
encourage a healthier balance. But the latter frame, let us be clear, is a
challenge to the default ethical vision of copyright itself, not merely a
critique of authorial behavior made from within that vision.
CONCLUSION
Here’s a word this essay hasn’t used until now: incentives. Here’s
another: justice. And another: norms. And yet another: authorship. Each
summons up a richly developed body of intellectual property theory. An
ethical vision of copyright can’t be reduced to any of these other, more
familiar scholarly approaches. Its arguments are not merely defective,
mangled versions of the conventional moves in copyright scholarship. It’s
a theory of intellectual property in its own right. It tells people what they
188. Susan Butler, One Artist’s Cautionary Tale, BILLBOARD, May 28, 2005, at 25
(quoting Andy Fraser) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Susan Butler, For the
Common Good?, BILLBOARD, May 28, 2005, at 21.
189. See Lessig 2.0, http://lessig.org/blog/2005/05/first_were_a_virus_now_we_kill.html
(May 22, 2005, 02:52 AM).
190. See, e.g., Emma Pike, Let’s Be Clear About Creative Commons, UK MUSIC, May
2005, http://www.ukmusic.org/page/article-5 (“For the huge tranche of writers falling
between the extremes of hobbyist versus big time, Creative Commons fails to deliver any
real benefits, yet some may be lured into it by its often seductive rhetoric.”).
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should and shouldn’t do with information goods; it tells lawmakers what
they should and shouldn’t allow. That alone makes it interesting and
worthy of study.
None of this, however, is meant to disparage these other approaches, all
of which remain interesting and useful. Instead, the most interesting thing
about an ethical vision of copyright may be the fresh perspective it gives us
on well-worn arguments. We can enrich our understanding of copyright
law by asking how it mediates among the conflicting claims of utilitarian
economics, distributive justice, natural rights—and relational ethics.191 We
can complicate our conversations about copynorms by studying how ethical
rhetoric is used to build up norms and to tear them down.192 We can craft
more compelling copyright reforms by framing them in ethically appealing
ways. Here are a few particularly intriguing questions we might ask:
- What is the connection between the nature of authorship
and the ethics of the author-audience relationship? This
essay has focused on ethical issues raised by the
enforcement side of copyright; we might do the same on
the source-of-rights side.
-

How stable are hybrids between commercial and amateur
culture, not just economically but ethically? If you and I
see each others’ choices as merely inefficient, we can
probably live and let live. But if we see each others’
choices as unethical, peaceful coexistence seems less
likely.

-

How do people connect their immediate ethical claims
about actions that are right or wrong in themselves with
longer-term stories about outcomes, incentive structures, a
good and just society, and so on? Almost everyone slips
back and forth between these ways of talking. Their
rhetorical moves might be interesting.

-

What would a truly ethical system of copyright law look
like? This essay has focused on the rhetoric of competing
ethical claims about copyright, rather than on the merits of
those claims. Perhaps philosophers might try to give one
of those claims a firm grounding—or to prove that no such
grounding is possible.

One author has already asked these questions. No one has done more to
integrate ethical perspectives with other ways of talking about copyright
than Larry Lessig. His two books of activism—Free Culture and Remix—
191. Compare, for example, the arguments discussed in this essay with the theories laid
out in Fisher, supra note 25.
192. See, e.g., Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can
Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651,
675–91, 710–18 (2006) (describing central role of reciprocity among musicians and fans in
sustaining a mixed system of commerce and sharing).
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move freely among these different ways of talking about copyright. Lessig
doesn’t theorize the approach closely; his books are works of activism, after
all. But there’s something to it, something worth dwelling on. He links
economic arguments about innovation and artistic productivity to moral
ones about the value of personal creativity and social engagement. Part of
his books’ extraordinary persuasive power comes from the ethical clarity
they bring to copyright policy.
Free Culture was inspired by Richard Stallman.193 Remix is dedicated to
Jack Valenti.194 Their author sits on the boards of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation195 and Creative Commons.196 Larry Lessig, just by himself, is
a plausible representative of all four ethical visions of copyright discussed
in this essay. They may differ in the details, but they’re united by a
common concern for a society in which people are creative and treat each
other well. Lessig shares that concern, and so should we.

193. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, at xv (2004).
194. LESSIG, supra note 172, at vii.
195. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Board of Directors, http://w2.eff.org/about/board/
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
196. Creative Commons, People, http://creativecommons.org/about/people (last visited
Mar. 24, 2009).

